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The Actio Iniuriarum in Scots Law: Romantic Romanism or 
Tool for Today? 
 
Kenneth McK. Norrie 
University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction 
Scots lawyers have always been fond of claiming that their system is one derived 
from principle rather than practice, that it has developed through the intellectual 
thought of our writers rather than through the piecemeal and arbitrary evolution of 
rules that is a defining characteristic of the common law.  We tend to see ourselves 
as part of the civilian tradition, having received Roman law, or at least Roman-Dutch 
law, at the most crucial stage in the development of our modern legal system, that is 
to say the period between the Reformation and the Enlightenment.  This reception 
was effected through the systematisation of Scots law achieved by the Institutional 
writers, who drew heavily on their Roman-Dutch training, rather than by the courts 
through case law.  Yet notwithstanding that claimed love of principle, the treatment of 
one of 5RPDQ ODZ¶V most significant contributions to legal thought, the actio 
iniuriarum, which was a central feature of the Scottish law of obligations during the 
Institutional period, was cavalier and even negligent throughout the 19th, and for 
much of the 20th, centuries.  It is only latterly that Scottish commentators, and even 
on occasion Scottish courts, are rediscovering our historical roots and we see once 
again the actio iniuriarum being called into aid ± both as a means of achieving an 
appropriate result in particular cases, and as a means by which we can understand 
the structural underpinning of our law of obligations.  This striking ambivalence 
towards the actio iniuriarum is probably explained by changing political imperatives.  
The Enlightenment Scots, Unionist to a man, exhibited a clear desire to associate 
themselves with the English and so participate in that great 18th and 19th century 
adventure, the British Empire; but as that Empire recedes into history, legal 
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nationalism reasserts itself once again by seeking a reconnection with our Romanist 
roots. 
However that may be, Scottish judges and legal commentators are today 
comfortable once again in using concepts derived from Roman law to tackle new 
legal problems, but of course nowadays we also have other tools to drive the 
development of the law, none more important than the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  This has had a profound effect on the development of the law of 
delict, both in the fields of personal injury1 and of course privacy.2   So the underlying 
question that I want to explore here is whether, in the modern world, Scots law gains 
anything by reactivating its long-neglected roots, over and above the tools that it 
unquestionably has.  Would we be better striking out in a new direction, connecting 
with the new ius commune of European Human Rights law, instead of rediscovering, 
reviving, and seeking to apply the principles underpinning the actio iniuriarum?  
Should we regard it as no more than a romantic Romanism, useful for emphasising 
our difference from English law, or use it as an active driver of the development of 
our law in the modern world?  It can be the latter only if it is able to serve some 
purpose other than or better than any other existing legal tool. 
  
Characteristics of the actio iniuriarum in Scots law 
It was during the Institutional period that the actio iniuriarum was directly received 
into our law and µinjury¶, in its specialised Roman sense, became understood to be 
an actionable wrong in Scotland.  Stair,3 though he lists a number of the interests 
that the law of Scotland protects, and talks of a general obediential obligation of 
reparation, does not mention injury as a separate wrong and it is left to Bankton, as 
always the most accessible of the Scottish Institutional writers, to give it unequivocal 
recognition.  He talks of µinjury¶ as a wrong independent of any other though it is 
                                               
1 Osman v United Kingdom [1999] 29 EHRR 245 applied, for example, in Chief Constable of Hertfordshire 
Police v Van Colle [2008] UKHL 50. 
2 Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 applied, for example, in Douglas v Hello (No 3) [2006] QB 125 
and Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
3 Institutions, 1, 9, 4. 
3 
 
clear that he is finding this wrong in an anglicised µiniuria¶, as something that is 
suffered, even although to the jurists of the ius commune that word more usually 
meant µwrongfulness¶ as a judgment rather than injury as a loss.4  µInjury¶ (as a loss) 
was almost, but not quite, synonymous with insult, that is to say an injury to dignity: it 
ZDVDQDWWDFNRQDSHUVRQ¶VKRQRXUGLJQLW\RUVWDWXV5  Now this was a µhigh-level 
principle¶, to use the words of Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright v Home Office,6 which of 
course as an analytical tool he rejected as being of no value to the development of 
the law. That rejection, however, reflects a peculiarly English mindset which has far 
less purchase in Scotland, for Scottish lawyers have never had a structural distrust 
for high-level principles from which we might extract particular rules of liability.7  The 
phrase actio iniuriarum was able, therefore, to serve as a useful shorthand to mean 
an action raised in response to an attack on one of the interests protected by, and 
prohibited under, the concept of iniuria, or injury.  Injury, in this sense, had at least 
three defining characteristics. 
 
(i) Affront 
The first question is what interests were protected by the actio iniuriarum, so that 
their infringement gave rise to liability?  Stair listed the interests that Scots law 
                                               
4 The ambiguity remains between injury as a loss and injury as an action.  The maxim volenti non fit iniuria 
might be translated either as a defence that negatives loss or as a defence that negatives wrongfulness.  The 
traditional formulation of a claim for damages in a Scottish court narrates that the pursuer has suffered µloss, 
injury or damage¶.  Yet, in the phrase damnum iniuria datum, or damage wrongfully caused, iniuria 
unambiguously means wrongfulness, and this was the primary meaning Bankton gave it when he described 
injury as being committed µHLWKHUE\)DFWVDVEHDWLQJRURWKHUDWWURFLRXVXVDJHRIRQH¶VSHUVRQE\:RUGV
reproachful and slanderous, so far as they infer a damage to the state of the person or wound his character; by 
Consent, in giving warrant, command or authority to commit the injury; or by Writing, as by composing 
LQIDPRXVOLEHOVDQGVDWLUHVWRRQH¶VGLVJUDFH¶: Institute 1, 10, 21. 
5 µInjury according to Stair, Bankton, Erskine and other writers on the law of Scotland, who in that respect adopt 
the language of the civil law, ³is an offence maliciously committed to the reproach and grievance of another, 
whereby his fame, dignity or reputation is hurt´¶: Newton v Fleming (1846) 8 D 677 (Lord Murray) , p.694. 
6 [2004] 2 AC 406 at 419. 
7 6WDLU¶Vµgeneral obediential obligation¶, for example, is clearly a µhigh-level principle¶ of a nature dismissed by 
Lord Hoffmann. 
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protected8 without explicitly tracing any of them to the general wrong of iniuria but, 
following the Roman law more closely, Bankton9 clearly envisaged a general wrong 
of ZKLFK 6WDLU¶V LQWHUHVWV DUH PHUHO\ H[DPSOHV  +H PDGH LW FOHDU that real injury 
included physical assault (if without using that precise term),10 but revealingly the 
loss for which a monetary redress was due was less physical than emotional, and 
this gives us our first, and perhaps most important, defining characteristic of the 
action: damages were not awarded because the pursuer had suffered physical 
injury11 but because he had suffered emotional disturbance.12  It was the affront at 
the insult to his honour that demanded redress rather than the corporeal effects on 
the pursuer of the wrongful act.  The protected interest was honour, or dignitas, and 
the loss suffered through its infringement was affront.13  Given the very incorporeality 
of such a loss, compensatory damages were not appropriate, for no true 
(commercial) value can be placed on affront, and instead monetary redress in the 
form of solatium was the appropriate remedy (remembering that punitive or 
exemplary damages have no place in the law of Scotland).  A solatium acted both as 
a solace to the affronted victim and an acknowledgement by the law that a wrong 
had been committed (iniuria, in the wider sense of wrongfulness).  Other 
infringements of interests that came within this high-level principle included wrongful 
imprisonment, defamation, and interference with family relationships: in all of these it 
was the element of affront that was the loss attracting monetary redress, and for this 
                                               
8 1, 9, 4. 
9 I, 10, 21-39. 
10 1, 10, 22.  See John Blackie in Rights of Personality in Scots Law,  eds N. Whitty and R. Zimmermann (DUP 
2009), 104-108 for the emergence of µassault¶ as a nominate wrong. 
11 Indeed, none may be suffered since the concept of assault has always included threats of assault. 
12 For cases involving real injury but no physical harm, see for example Gordon v Stewart (1842) 5D 8 (an 
DWWHPSWWRWRXFKWKHSXUVXHU¶VQRVHµin an insulting manner¶) and Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14D 314 (riding a 
horse at the pursuer).  For the modern law concerning the emotional aspects of assault, see Elspeth Reid 
Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (SULI, 2010) at paras. 2.19-2.23. 
13 In Roman law an attack on dignitas was likely thought wrongful because of its potential to distrupt the 
stability of a highly stratified society, but in Scotland the loss always was a more personal affront. 
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reason many of the modern forms of liability traced to the actio iniuriarum may 
conveniently be referred to as the µaffront-based delicts¶.14 
 
(ii) Intent 
The second definitional characteristic of iniuria concerns the nature of fault (or 
wrongfulness) that it was (or is) necessary for a pursuer to establish.  Now to a large 
extent this is explained by the jurisdictional rules of the Scottish courts in the 
Institutional period.  Insofar as it concerned dignitas, that is to say the place of a 
SHUVRQ LQ VRFLHW\ WKH SHUVRQ¶V honour, dignity and status), µinjury¶ jurisdictionally 
belonged to the Commissary court, which had taken over the Consistorial jurisdiction 
of the Courts of the Official (the papal courts) at the Reformation.15  With those 
injuries that led to death or physical harm, the Justiciary Court had jurisdiction.  
There was some overlap between the Commissary and the criminal court, and even 
between these courts and the civil courts, but the remaining dividing lines were 
removed entirely when the Court of Session took over jurisdiction for all delictual (as 
opposed to criminal) liability, which it had done by 1830.16  The flavour of criminality 
remained, however, even when redress for the wrong was sought only in the civil 
courts, and this fact, together with the historical influence of the church courts which 
focused on matters of conscience, meant that the nature of fault with iniuria in 
Scotland was always intent.  It follows that the affront-based delicts were and are 
intentional delicts.  As the Court of Session put it in 1765: 
An actio iniuriarum, where there is no patrimonial loss, and where the 
damages awarded are only in solatium, must be founded upon dolus malus, 
according to the opinions of all writers upon law; and so far it differs from 
                                               
14 Bankton explicitly sees injury as an µaffront¶: I, 10, 38.  According to Erskine, Institute, IV, 4, 80, µthe crime 
of injury, in a strict acceptation, consists in the reproaching or affronting our neighbours¶. 
15 The Court of the Official, Stair Society, vol. 34 (1982). 
16 Blackie (n 10), 35-40. 
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damages awarded to repair patrimonial loss, in which it is sufficient to specify 
even culpa levissima.17  
This remains the case today and it is this fact that justifies recovery for a wider range 
of losses than is possible with aquilian liability.  Negligence, or the unintentional 
causing of injury, does not found liability for mere mental disturbance unless that 
disturbance amounts to a recognised psychiatric illness, but the matter is very 
different when the harm has been caused intentionally.18  While it is good social 
policy to accept that distress and upset are part and parcel of life itself and therefore 
have to be borne without redress, it is also good legal policy to discourage people 
from acting with the intention of causing such upset.19  Remember that solatium not 
only provides a solace but it also acts as an acknowledgement that some legal 
wrong has been committed and so it is peculiarly appropriate that redress should be 
available for intentional wrongfulness, even when that does not lead to physical and 
quantifiable loss, injury or damage. 
We need to be clear, however, as to the exact nature of µintent¶ that is necessary to 
found liability.  It would seem that there is no requirement to intend to cause 
emotional distress and that it is sufficient for liability that the defender intended to do 
the wrongful act.20  However, because this rather contradicts the policy basis that 
justifies recognising liability for affront in the first place (discouraging people from 
acting in a manner designed to cause affront), something additional to the intent to 
                                               
17 Graeme and Skene v Cunningham (1765) Mor 13923.  See also Newton v Fleming (1846) 8D 677 (Lord 
Murray), 694: µBut in order to make out injury, it must be shown in the outset that there is an offence committed 
and malice¶. 
18 Lord Hoffman in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655, 707 pointed out that there was no reason why a 
tort of intention should be subjected to the same limitations to compensation as the tort of negligence, in 
particular the rule that excludes damages for distress short of psychiatric injuries: µThe policy considerations are 
quite different¶. 
19 An example I gave some years ago (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol 15 (1996), para 437) was of a person 
locking a building with someone inside.  If this is done intentionally to imprison the person damages for 
emotional upset might be recoverable, but if it is merely negligent there is no animus iniuriandi and emotional 
upset is not enough to sound in damages  -  though the negligent act might lead to damages if it causes 
patrimonial loss. 
20 See further Kenneth Norrie µActions for Verbal Injury¶, (2003) 7 ELR 390. 
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do the act is necessary before liability is established.  In English law21 this additional 
element is the concept of imputed malice.  Intentionally doing an act that leads to an 
unintended (or, perhaps better, a non-intended) injury may impute µmalice¶ in the 
English sense.22  But Scots law seems to take a different approach to justify 
imposing liability on someone for an intentional act when they did not specifically 
intend the harmful result of the act.  Scots law betrays very clearly its civilian roots 
here, for it imposes liability for harmful consequences when there is no lawful 
justification for doing the intentional act.23  Wrongfulness is found not in the intention 
to do an act which injures, but in the intention to do an injurious act without having 
lawful authority to do it.  This has long been the justification for giving damages for 
assault, in the sense of physical touching without the lawful authority of consent24 
and the same thinking can be seen in quite different aspects of the law of 
obligations, such as unjustified enrichment, where it is now clear that enrichments 
will be reversed where there is no legal authority to keep the enrichment.25  We see 
this again in real injury cases such as wrongful imprisonment and wrongful 
prosecution where fault is typically found in µmalice and want of probable cause¶.  
Affront is therefore not enough to found liability under the actio iniuriarum in 
Scotland: it must be affront caused by an intentional act done without lawful 
justification, and it is for the pursuer to aver and show this lack of lawful justification. 
 
(iii) Real and verbal injuries 
                                               
21 See discussion in Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 (Lord Hoffmann), 424-426. 
22 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, as explained by Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright, above. 
23 Barratt International Resorts Ltd v Barratt Owners Group 2003 GWD 1-19 (OH).  I had earlier suggested 
that (at least in the context of a requirement for malice in cases of qualified privilege in defamation) µmalice 
does not in this context connote bad intent, but more lack of good intent¶:  Defamation and Related Actions in 
Scots Law (Butterworths, 1995) at p. 120.  Privilege in defamation is based on presumed good intent, and malice 
in that context is therefore the lack of good intent. 
24 See H. McKechnie in Greens Encyclopaedia (1931) vol 12 at para 1124: µThe essence of assault is insult 
rather than actual physical hurt ... In its civil aspect it consists of an overt physical act intended to insult another 
and committed without lawful justification or excuse¶. 
25 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian Regional Council 1995 SC 151; Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 
725. 
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Affront was the basis of iniuria in Roman law as it is in Scots law; intent was part of 
the Roman law too, if only by default since the distinction between intent, 
recklessness and negligence was never truly drawn by the Romans. The third 
defining characteristic of the Scots law of iniuria is also taken directly from Roman 
law:26 this is the structural distinction that we make between real injuries and verbal 
injuries.  Now, it is a common mistake to interpret this as referring to the losses 
suffered XVLQJµLQMXU\¶LQLWVVHQVHRIORVVUDWKHUWKDQLWVVHQVHRIZURQJIXOQHVV.  In 
fact, the distinction is between the methods of causing the loss.  Real injuries are 
injuries caused by physical acts (subdivided into wrongs such as assault, mutilation, 
killing and rape) while verbal injuries are those caused by the use of words (originally 
this class was not subdivided, but it later became divided into defamation and other 
verbal injuries27).  The legal distinction between these two categories in Scotland 
was, however, jurisdictional rather than substantive, with the Justiciary Court dealing 
with real injuries (in both the criminal and the civil sense) and the Commissary Court 
dealing with verbal injuries.28  However, once jurisdiction had been transferred from 
both of these courts to the civil courts,29 the continuing relevance of the distinction 
becomes open to question, except insofar as it indicates a factual difference with 
wrongful imprisonment (for example) being a real injury because it is effected by 
physical acts, and defamation being a verbal injury because it is effected by words.  
In truth it was never a particularly helpful distinction even in a classificatory sense 
because it is easy to imagine cases in which it is difficult or impossible to say 
whether it is physical acts or words that have caused the loss.  For example if I have 
in my possession a compromising letter that you wrote, or that someone wrote to 
                                               
26 D.47.10.1.1: Ulpian reports that Labeo (who was alive at the very end of the Republic) distinguishes between 
µiniuriam ... aut re aut verbis¶, though Paul du Plessis concludes (CHAPTER?) that the distinction was in reality 
that of Ulpian and no earlier.  That the distinction was made in Roman-Dutch law is evident from Francois du 
%RLV¶contribution to the present book: µThe Actio Iniuriarum and the Emergence of a Right to Feelings¶ 
(CHAPTER?) 
27 Scots law never distinguished between the different methods of communicating words, whether for example 
spoken or written and so has never distinguished between what in English law is called libel and slander. 
28 Blackie (n 10), 76 
29 The Commissary Court was abolished in 1830, its jurisdiction being taken over by the Court of Session, as 
was the Jury Court which had been created in 1815 with jurisdiction to hear µall actions on account of injury to 
the person, whether real or verbal, as assault and battery, libel or defamation¶ (actions listed in the Court of 
Session Act 1825, s.28). 
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you, is my giving it to a third party to see and to read a verbal or a real injury?  If it is 
a breach of confidence, or is defamatory, it is clearly an injury, but given the unified 
jurisdiction of the civil courts today there really is little if any point in classifying it one 
way or the other.30 
 
A Change of Focus in the 19th Century 
In the 19th Century, there were three crucial developments in the law of obligations 
that substantially changed the focus of iniuria and moved Scots law some distance 
away from its civilian roots.  First, as happened elsewhere, the action for negligence 
came to dominate the law of delict in Scotland: peripheral at the start of the 19th 
Century, negligence was ubiquitous by the end.  Yet the modern ubiquity of the 
action for negligence obscures to our contemporary eyes the exceptionality of a legal 
remedy pronounced against an individual who did not intend to cause any harm.  
Liability in negligence lends itself well to losses of a physical nature, patrimonial in 
the case of damage to property and personal in the case of damage to human body 
or mind, and it does have a deontological attractiveness in its provision of redress 
against persons who neglected to do what they ought to have done.  But affront is 
not and never has been a justifiable human reaction to unintended acts.  We are 
affronted at insult not because of its effect but because of the intent with which it is 
done.  Our dignity is not ± cannot be ± harmed by accident, but by the knowledge (or 
ourselves, and of others) that there has been a deliberate effort to undermine it.  We 
may feel emotional distress at accidental injury, but that distress cannot truly be 
characterised as DIIURQWZKLFKLVSURSHUO\DUHDFWLRQWRDGHOLEHUDWHDVVDXOWRQRQH¶V
sense of worth.   
The second 19th Century development was that in Scottish court practice the very 
phrase µactio iniuriarum¶ began to be misused, and it took on a meaning that none of 
the Institutional writers, nor the civilian writers of the ius commune, would ever have 
                                               
30 In Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson 2011 GWD 14-321 (Sheriff Principal Bowen) it was held that it 
mattered little whether the claim was one for defamation or for verbal injury: but that was in the context of the 
remedy of interdict, where all that is necessary to show is a legal wrong (as opposed to the particular legal 
wrong).  The opportunity was, thereby, lost to examine the parameters of verbal injury (in that case as an 
economic, as opposed to personality, loss). 
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given it.  Perhaps because aquilian liability, as manifested in the action for 
negligence, expanded from patrimonial to all physical losses, including bodily injury, 
the word µinjury¶ came to be used in a far wider sense than Bankton had used it: the 
word became, and indeed remains, the denominator of a central aspect of the law of 
negligence ± personal injury.  Of course physical injury leads to damages, while 
solatium remains the appropriate remedy covering monetary redress given as solace 
for emotional injury, but one particular type of solace came, for reasons that are yet 
obscure,31 to be seen as so peculiarly associated with the actio iniuriarum that the 
very term became synomymous with the claim.  This was the solatium awarded to a 
surviving relative on the death of a person wrongfully killed ± a bereavement award, 
in other words.32  By the mid-19th century most people who were wrongfully killed 
were killed negligently and the continuation of the long-established practice of 
awarding solatium to the relatives of those wrongfully killed had the effect of blurring 
the distinction between iniuria and negligence33, so much so that by the mid-20th 
century, judges (though not writers) were describing the method of attaining any 
damages for non-patrimonial (and so non-quantifiable) losses caused through 
negligence as an actio iniuriarum.34  It took Lord Kilbrandon in the House of Lords 
decision of McKendrick v Sinclair35 to remind Scottish court practitioners what writers 
had been saying for some decades36 that the action for negligence, whoever the 
pursuer is and whatever the physical loss suffered, is traced to the lex aquilia while 
the actio iniuriarum is properly concerned with cases of intentional insult or affront.  
                                               
31 The error is traced by TB Smith (n 36 below) to Lord President Inglis in Eisten v North British Railway Co 
(1870) 8 Macph 980. 
32 Now governed by the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011. 
33 In Black v North British Railway Co 1908 SC 444, 453, Lord President Dunedin may be found saying: µThe 
end of it all is that I think solatium borrowed from the action of assythment, has in the actio iniuriarum come to 
mean reparation for feelings²in short all reparation which is not comprehended under the heading of actual 
patrimonial loss.¶ 
34 See for exampOH/RUG$YRQVLGH¶Vfirst instance judgment in McKendrick v Sinclair 1972 SC(HL) 25. 
35 1972 SC (HL) 25.  See also Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Robertson v Turnbull 1982 SC(HL) 1 at p. 8. 
36 McKechnie, Scottish Legal History in Stair Society vol 20 at 276-277 and Greens Encyclopaedia of the Laws 
of Scotland (1931) vol. 12 at paras. 1088-1090; TB Smith Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962), at 
pp 653-663, and µDesignation of Delicual Actions: Damn iniuria damn¶ 1972 SLT (News) 125 and µDamn 
Iniuria Again¶ 1984 SLT (News) 85. 
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However, the crucial effect of seeing bereavement awards as the major application 
of the actio iniuriarum was that it shifted the focus of the loss away from affront to 
dignity, and towards hurt to feelings.  Emotional distress, upset and sadness are the 
natural consequences of bereavement in the way that affront, or insult, or the taking 
of offence, is not.  This opened the way for the actio iniuriarum to expand its 
parameters beyond insult and towards hurt feelings, and it is this that gives the 
action its potential in the modern age. 
The third crucial development in the 19th Century was the response of the law to a 
hardening of the rules applicable to the wrong of defamation.  This was and is in 
Scotland an archetypical affront-based delict, even if there was always the possibility 
of claiming for patrimonial loss caused through damage to the economic worth of 
RQH¶VUHSXWDWLRQ in the same action.37  That affront founds the action explains why, 
unlike in English law, it has always been possible in Scotland to sue for defamation 
even if no-one other than the pursuer hears the words used by the defender ± there 
is no need for µcommunication¶ in the English sense.38  However, after some decades 
of doubt, it was conclusively settled in 1859 that truth is an absolute defence to an 
action for defamation.39  In itself a perfectly sound rule40 ± even with a civilian 
conception of defamation being an iniuria, or an affront to dignity41, on the basis that 
a person has no business being affronted by having his true character revealed ± the 
rule nevertheless seems right away to have been assumed to apply to all injuries 
                                               
37 I describe defamation as a µJanus-headed delict protecting [the] personality right to honour (dignity) and [the] 
patrimonial right to reputation¶: Norrie, µThe Scots Law of Defamation: Is There a Need for Reform?¶ in Whitty 
and Zimmermann (n 10), 435. 
38 Mackay v McCankie (1883) 10 R 537.  Lord Kilbrandon said, in µThe Law of Privacy in Scotland¶ (1971) 2 
Cambrian L.Rev 31,.38: µ,QVXFKDFDVHWKHGDPDJHLVGRQHQHLWKHUWRWKHPDQ¶VSDWULPRQ\QRUWRKLVUHSXWDWLRQ
which remain respectively undiminished and untarnished.  The damage is done to his dignity, and is thus 
actionable under the old law¶. 
39 Mackellar v Duke of Sutherland (1859) 21 D 222.  The same is true in England and the history and continuing 
justification of the rule in English law is explained by Eric Descheemaeker in µ ³Veritas non est defamatio´? 
Truth as a Defence in the Law of Defamation¶, (2011) 31 LS 1. 
40 See Descheemaeker (n 39)+LVDUJXPHQWDOOXGHGWRLQWKHDUWLFOH¶VYHU\WLWOHLVthat in English law 
defamation is by definition false because the interest being protected is deserved reputation. 
41 Putting it at its simplest, the Scottish approach to defamation is that it protects dignitas, the third of 8OSLDQ¶V 
bases of iniuria, before fama, which was the second: D. 47, 10, 1, 2. 
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caused through words and not only the form of verbal injury that we call defamation.  
So other types of verbal injury took on truth as an absolute defence even when they 
are non-defamatory.  But since it is defamatoriness that justifies the court in 
presuming falsity (so that truth in defamation is properly a defence for the defender 
to prove), in non-defamatory cases of verbal injury falsity became part of the 
definition of the wrong (and so for the pursuer to prove).42  Now, requiring falsity to 
be established in non-defamatory cases of verbal injury is actually very odd if the 
essence of the wrong is affront caused without legal justification.  Clearly a person 
may legitimately be affronted in circumstances in which truth or falsehood really is 
neither here nor there.  This did not really matter before 1859 where there was no 
real need to distinguish between defamation and other forms of verbal injury, but 
there have long been two particular types of allegation which, though clearly harmful, 
do not come within the modern definition of what is µdefamatory¶ in the Sim v 
Stretch43 sense.  With neither can falsehood be the essence of the wrong, and yet 
they have both, almost by default, been swept into the wrong of defamation.  First 
there are allegations of bankruptcy.  These might or might not be defamatory 
depending on whether any fraud or business incompetence or impropriety is implied 
but damages have long been recoverable under defamation even when no such 
innuendo is drawn:44 the only explanation is that the pursuer has been affronted,45 
but affront does not make the statement defamatory, and truth may not diminish the 
affront.  Secondly the drawing attention to disease or deformity46 (in particular the 
                                               
42 This is probably why pursuers have long preferred to squeeze their actions into defamation where they get the 
benefit of the presumption of truth, rather than raise their case in a more natural way under another action for 
verbal injury where they would have themselves to prove falsity. It is interesting to note that in 1936 a claim for 
what was effectively breach of privacy by unwarranted surveillance was raised as an action for defamation in 
Robertson v Keith 1936 SC 29 while in 2003 it was argued in privacy in Martin v McGuiness 2003 SLT 1424. 
43 [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (Lord Atkin): µWould the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of 
right-thinking members of society generally?¶ 
44 Outram & Co v Reid (1852) 14 D 577; Anderson v Drummond and Graham (1887) 14R 568, Barr v 
0XVVHOEXUJK0HUFKDQWV¶$VVRFLDWLRQ1912 SC 174; Russell v Stubbs 1913 SC(HL) 14; Mazure v Stubbs Ltd 
1919 SC(HL) 112. 
45 In Murray v Bonn (1913) 29 Sh. Ct. Rep. 62 affront was the express basis of the award of solatium. 
46 Bankton included within defamation cases where a person charged the pursuer µwith a foul disease, whereby 
his character is blemished¶: I, 10, 24.  Erskine, however, explicitly held it wrongful even when µthe infirmities of 
that sort imply no real reproach, either in themselves or in the just opinion of mankind¶: IV, 4, 80. 
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socially unmentionable impotency)47 is clearly a matter of informational privacy, and 
its breach may well be a civil wrong, yet again it is constantly cited in the literature as 
an example of defamation.48  In reality, both of these are affront-based verbal injuries 
that have been sucked into defamation when the category of non-defamatory verbal 
injury was squeezed almost out of existence. 
The residual category of non-defamatory verbal injury was effectively limited to what 
we call the public hatred, contempt and ridicule cases49 (or, again following Ulpian,50 
convicium).  Yet even here from the 19th Century the law focused on truth and falsity, 
which hardly arises and explains why so few public hatred cases are successful  -  
and those that are51 are really actions for defamation argued a slightly peculiar way.  
There is some evidence that more recently the Scottish courts are beginning to 
refocus their enquiry in this direction.52  If, however, truth as a defence is limited (as 
it should be) to the action based on lie-mongering (defamation) then the actio 
iniuriarum can much more comfortably be utilised to provide redress for hurt feelings 
when the truth is being broadcast in a way that has no legal justification. 
 
The actio iniuriarum in modern Scots law 
So what of the actio iniuriarum in the modern law?  Does it remain useful as a µhigh-
level principle¶ in the way that was disapproved by Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright?  
                                               
47 µThat peculiar defect in respect of which marriage may be annulled¶ as Lord Deas archly put it in 
Cunningham v Phillips (1868) 6M 926, 928. 
48 Though, in truth, no case has been identified in which an action for defamation has been raised on this point 
alone. A false allegation that a person had contracted a sexually transmitted disease may amount to an allegation 
of sexual misconduct: A v B 1907 SC 1154.  The allegation of insanity in Mackintosh v Weir (1875) 2R 877 may 
be taken, in that different age, to impute moral fault. 
49 Sheriff v Wilson (1855) 17D 528; Cunningham v Phillips (1868) 6M 926; Macfarlane v Black and Co (1887) 
14R 870; Paterson v Welch (1893) 20 R 744; Andrew v Macara 1917 SC 247; Lamond v Daily Record 
(Glasgow) Ltd 1923 SLT 512; Caldwell v Bayne (1936) 52 Sh Ct Rep 334; Steele v Scottish Daily Record 1970 
SLT 53. 
50 D. 47.10.15.15. 
51 Such as Lamond v Daily Record (Glasgow) Ltd 1923 SLT 512. 
52 See Barratt International Resorts Ltd v %DUUDWW2ZQHUV¶*URXS 2003 GWD 1-19, and comment thereon by K. 
Norrie in µActions for Verbal Injury¶ (2003) 7 ELR 390. 
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The concept continues to receive occasional, possibly increasing, judicial mention in 
the Scottish law reports, though in no modern case is it possible to say definitively 
that the judge decided the matter before him by application of the actio iniuriarum in 
a manner that would not have been possible had the actio never been received into 
our law.  Perhaps, however, that is too strict a test for the continued relevance of the 
actio in Scotland today, because Scots law has traditionally eschewed any reliance 
on name-based classifications.  It is possible to identify a number of cases that 
illustrate a willingness on the part of the Scottish courts to award monetary redress 
through the recognition of sometimes unarticulated notions of honour, dignity or 
esteem as legally protected interests that have been infringed by deliberate act done 
without legal justification.  A starting point might be to compare the Scottish and 
English approaches to similar claimed wrongs where the two jurisdictions produce 
different results. 
Wainwright v Home Office53 is the well-known and important House of Lords decision 
that denied the existence of a µhigh level right to privacy¶ from which different actions 
may emerge.  The case involved the strip-searching of visitors to a prison, which was 
carried out in a manner contrary to prison regulations.  The claimants were affronted 
at this indignity, but they failed in their action, the Court holding that there was no 
common law tort of invasion of privacy and that any gap between that proposition 
and article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights could be filled by judicial 
development of existing actions.  Interestingly, however, the judges did not entirely 
exclude the possibility that an action based on the intentional causing of distress that 
fell short of psychiatric harm might be actionable, though Lord Hoffman was clear to 
the effect that if such an action were to be successful it would have to be shown that 
the defendant actually intended to cause emotional distress, rather than simply 
intentionally doing an act that caused emotional distress.  Imputed malice of the sort 
that founded liability in Wilkinson v Downton54 would never, he made plain, be 
sufficient. 
                                               
53 [2003] UKHL 53. 
54 [1897] 2 QB 57.  Here the defendant had intended to do the act but not to cause the injury, but damages were 
still awarded on the theory of imputed intention (doing such a dangerous act imputes an intention to cause the 
harm that directly arises from it).  In Wainwright Lord Hoffman said that µimputed intention will not do¶ for 
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That English case may be compared with a similar Scottish decision, Henderson v 
Chief Constable of Fife,55 where a woman who had been arrested during the course 
of an industrial dispute was required, on being placed in a police cell, to remove her 
bra.  Now, this was a correct application of police procedure (unlike, be it noted, the 
strip-search in Wainwright) but nevertheless Lord Jauncey in the Outer House of the 
Court of Session (in one of his last judgments there before his elevation to the House 
of Lords) held that the unthinking and unjustifiable application of police procedure 
when it was unnecessary (for there was no possibility of this woman being a suicide 
risk, or using her bra to attack policemen) amounted to a wrong for which damages 
could be claimed.  He made no explicit mention of the actio iniuriarum but the wrong 
suffered was clearly an affront:  
I consider that Mrs Henderson has established that the request to remove her 
brassiere was an interference with her liberty which was not justified in law, from 
which it follows that she has a remedy in damages ... I consider that a figure of £300 
would fairly reflect the invasion of privacy and liberty which Mrs Henderson suffered 
as a result of having to remove her brassiere. 56 
Now, in neither Wainwright nor Henderson was there any deliberate intent on the 
part of the police or prison service to humiliate or affront anyone and while that was 
enough to bring the case to an end in England, it was not enough in Scotland: in the 
English case fault was required to be found in direct intent to inflict emotional harm 
(which did not exist) while in the Scottish case fault was located in the lack of legal 
justification for the actions which caused the affront.  Following correct procedure 
was not in itself a justification. 
We again see fault being constructed as lack of legal justification for the act in 
question in the Scottish post-mortem cases.57  In each of these three cases, decided 
in the early years of the 20th century, the bodies of deceased persons had been 
                                                                                                                                                  
injuries short of psychiatric illness, such as affront.  µThe defendant must actually have acted in a way which he 
knew to be unjustifiable and either intended to cause harm or at least acted without caring whether he caused 
harm or not¶: [2003] UKHL 53, [45]. 
55 1988 SLT 361. 
56 1988 SLT at 367. 
57 Pollok v Workman (1900) 7 SLT 338; Conway v Dalziel (1901) 9 SLT 86; Hughes v Robertson 1913 SC 394. 
16 
 
interfered with for medical reasons without the knowledge or consent of the 
GHFHDVHG¶VUHODWLYHVDQGZKLOHWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIDFWLRQDELOLW\ZDVIRUWKHPRVWSDUW
obiter, the judges in each were willing to contemplate that damages might be 
awarded to the relatives for the distress that they suffered.  They belong to the same 
group of cases as Henderson, since it was the lack of legal authority to act that 
rendered the post-mortems actionable.  Whitty has argued, persuasively, that the 
only explanation for these cases is that the remedy applicable was solatium for 
affront which derives directly from the actio iniuriarum.58  He quotes Bankton (who 
claims authority from the Digest) that µInjury, may not only be done to the Living, but 
also in a manner to the Dead, by reproaching their memory, detaining their bodies 
from burial, lifting their bodies out of their graves, or defacing their monuments.  The 
children or next of kin may prosecute the injuries done to the remains of their parent 
or relation¶.59 
The matter was discussed in a more modern case, and one that provides the most 
direct affirmation of the continuing authority in 21st century Scotland of the actio 
iniuriarum.  In Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust60 an action for damages was raised by a 
bereaved mother against a health board who had removed and retained the organs 
of her deceased baby child without her knowledge or consent.  The action was 
H[SOLFLWO\EDVHGXSRQWKHPRWKHU¶VULJKWQRW to be exposed to injury to her emotional 
health.  The defence was that there was no doctor-patient relationship between the 
hospital and the mother such as would give rise to a duty of care.  The temporary 
judge held that that defence might have been appropriate in an action for negligence, 
traced to the lex aquilia, but the claim at hand was in contrast one traced to the actio 
iniuriarum.  He held that Scots law recognised as a legal wrong, for which damages 
by way of solatium could be claimed, the unauthorised removal and retention of 
organs from a dead body.  ,WZDVWKHMXGJH¶VYLHZ that the earlier post-mortem cases 
were not explained as an extended application of assythment (the native Scottish 
                                               
58 Niall Whitty, µRights of Personality, Property Rights and the Human Body in Scots Law¶ (2005) 9 ELR 194, 
216. 
59 I, 10, 29.  This suggests, however, more a representational than a direct liability.  In fact, the post-mortem 
cases, if based on injury as Whitty suggests, are examples of injury to feelings as opposed to affront to dignity. 
60 2006 SLT 889 (OH). 
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remedy for wrongfully inflicted death)61 but as an aspect of the actio iniuriarum, in 
particular because the damage being sued upon was the emotional distress suffered 
by the pursuers.  Again, actionability is clearly founded on the lack of legal authority 
to do the act.62 
Stevens might usefully be compared with the factually similar English case of A v 
Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust63, where damages were denied, though that 
action was explicitly raised in negligence, and explicitly decided on the basis of the 
KRVSLWDO¶VOHJDOULJKWWRUHPRYHWKHRUJDQV6RWKHUHwas no discussion of affront as 
the basis of the action, or of the nature of intent.  But if the hospital did have legal 
authority to remove the organs the action is likely to have failed in Scotland too. 
 
Future developments 
There is little doubt, then, that the Scottish courts, if they are so minded, could build 
upon the concept of iniuria in order to provide monetary redress in the form of 
solatium in approproate contexts.  The question is, in what contexts today would it be 
appropriate to do so?  There are clearly some interests, historically protected by the 
actio iniuriarum, which if they are interfered with today would not, in the eyes of the 
modern world, justify an award of solatium.  Interference with family relations is an 
example.  Rape64 or sexual abuse was and is clearly a direct iniuria against the 
victim, and not just for the physical injury involved.65 But the actio iniuriarum, 
                                               
61 See Kenneth Norrie in A History of Scottish Private Law eds K. Reid and R Zimmermann, (OUP, 2000), 484-
488. 
62 While the post-mortem examination of the dead child was not in this case unauthorised, the removal and 
retention of her brain tissue was.  
63 [2005] QB 506. 
64 In the modern sense, as well as the older sense of µrapt¶, which included an element of abduction: see John 
Blackie (CHAPTER ?) 
65 In G v Glasgow City Council 2011 SC 1, [30] the Inner House of the Court of Session said this: µSexual abuse 
is not really about physical injury. It is more about affront and degradation¶.  A more old-fashioned way of 
seeing the matter, but still clearly as an aspect of iniuria, is shown in A v.C (1919) 35 Sh Ct Rep 166 where a 
PDUULHGZRPDQ¶VFODLPZDVKHOGFRPSHWHQWDVDPHDQVRIYLndicating her character. (The competency of the 
action had been challenged by the defender on the ground that he had paid £20 µdamages¶ to the husband and 
that the wife had no independent right of action). 
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protecting the family relationship as in itself a value, recognised more than one victim 
to rape.  When a married woman was raped, the actio iniuriarum gave the husband a 
claim:66 LQ:DONHU¶VZRUGV 
It is also a wrong to her husband, justifying an actio iniuriarum at his instance; 
the wrong consists in the gross affront to the husband, the hurt to his feelings, 
the violatiRQRI WKHKXVEDQG¶V ULJKW WR WKHH[FOXVLYHSRVVHVVLRQRI KLVZLIH¶V
person, and the dishonour done to his marriage-bed by the other man.67 
It is difficult to believe that such an action would succeed, on this basis, today.  The 
state has an obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to protect 
citizens from sexual attack68 but that obligation is amply fulfilled through the criminal 
law, and an argument that there is something missing with the lack of civil remedy 
available to the husband of a rape victim will get nowhere under article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.69  We simply do not see the husband and 
wife relationship today in terms that would found any action based on his affront at 
her rape (however real his emotional distress might be and however clearly there is 
a lack of legal justification for the act). 
Adultery too was an actionable wrong70 because it was an affront against the 
KXVEDQG¶VKRQRXUWKRXJKQRWrevealingly, WKHZLIH¶V71  Again, the abolition of that 
action72 involves no incompatibility with the European Convention.  I see no gap in 
the law if we say today that, however much a man is genuinely affronted by his wife 
                                               
66 See Black v Duncan 1924 SC 738. 
67 Walker Delict (2nd edn, OUP 1981), 714. 
68 Article 3 (µNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment¶) imposes 
positive obligations on the state to ensure that its criminal law provides sufficient protection to its citizens: A v 
United Kingdom [1998] 2 FLR 959. 
69 For similar reasons the husbands in CR v United Kingdom, SW v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 363 had 
no claim when the English courts moved away from the proposition that no man may rape his wife on the basis 
that her consent to marriage carries with it, for all time coming, consent to sexual intercourse.  The Scottish 
courts had come to that conclusion a few years earlier: S v HM Adv 1989 SLT 469. 
70 Interestingly, this was recognised only relatively late in the development of the law: Hume Lectures III, 130. 
71 Steedman v Coupar (1743) Mor. 7337; Kirk v Guthrie (1817) 1 Mur 271. 
72 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s. 10(1). 
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being unfaithful, or leaving him,73 he cannot recover a monetary solace for his 
damaged self-esteem, or even for his furt feelings.  Our concepts of loss and 
damage can surely change to such an extent that what was once regarded as an 
affront ought no longer to be so.74  Breach of promise of marriage, which was only 
recognised as giving rise to delictual liability in the early 19th century,75 was explicitly 
abolished by s.1(1) of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984, and 
the affront and indignity of such a breach is no longer regarded by modern society as 
requiring monetary redress.  Even if we cannot deny that (in some circumstances at 
least) breaking off an engagement might be personally devastating, it does not follow 
that we should see our personal relationships as part of our dignity and self-esteem: 
they are consensual relationships of equals, not enhancements of our honour and 
status. 
At a broader level, it also seems to me that the very concept of µhonour¶ as a 
personal interest needs to be regarded with deep suspicion.  In a society with 
virtually unanimity in its moral outlook (which is, surely, a hugely unattractive society) 
it might be possible to regard DQDWWDFNRQDSHUVRQ¶Vhonour as an µinjury¶, but today 
honour is an entirely self-defined notion with no generally accepted social content.  
Putting it at its most benign, µhonour¶ is characterised by pomposity and self-regard; 
                                               
73 Enticing a woman to leave her husband amounted to a civil wrong against the husband and examples are 
found well into the 20th century: Adamson v Gillibrand 1923 SLT 328 (mother incited her daughter to leave her 
husband); McGeever v McFarlane 6K&W5HSKXVEDQG¶VORYHULQGXFHGKLPWROHDYHKLVZLIH
The action for enticement was abolished by s.2(2) of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984. 
74 Other wrongs against family relationships have been recognised by the law of Scotland.  Plagium, or child-
stealing, might well have been regarded in the Institutional period as a real injury, but it has survived only in its 
criminal aspects today. Damages do not lie in negligence for wrongful interference with the parent-child 
relationship (McKeen v Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police 1994 SLT 93) and, even if this is done 
with intent, it is difficult today to accept that the real harm GRQHZKHQRQH¶VFKLOGLVNLGQDSSHGLVDQDIIURQWWR
RQH¶VGLJQLW\. 
75 Hogg v Gow 27 May 1812 FC.  Previously, as Blackie points out (n10, 125) the simple withdrawal from an 
engagement, if not done in particularly egregious circumstances or in a particularly hurtful way, was not in itself 
regarded as an injury: Johnston v Pasley (1770) Mor 13916.  He suggests (126) that the recognition of breach of 
promise in itself was a result of a growing sentimentality in the early 19th century, and a softening of the ideal of 
femininity.  The judges in Hogg v Gow recognised that they were reflecting views of society that had not been 
held generally in Scotland in a (not much) earlier and rougher age.  Another explanation for the historical 
absence from Scots law of breach of promise as an actionable wrong is the fact that, if the promise were 
followed by sexual intercourse, the parties became married in any case through operation of the Canon law 
doctrine of marriage per verba de futuro subsequente copula, which survived in Scotland until the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1939. 
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at its most malign, we are too distressingly used to hearing about µhonour killings¶ 
and the like to be much attracted to µhonour¶ as a legally protected interest.  Some 
men probably are genuinely affronted by their sisters and daughters wanting to lead 
a life of social and sexual freedom, and their sense of religious duty might well 
compel them to attempt to force their wills upon their sisters and daughters by harsh 
physical means, but the modern law cannot give any value to µhonour¶ in this sense.  
Nor is there much attraction in expanding liability for hurt feelings beyond the narrow 
bounds set for it in negligence and the long-established, but ultimately peculiar,76 
claim for bereavement awards.  However, it may be that hurt feelings combined with 
a social necessity for the law to give some recognition that a wrong has been 
committed is (just) enough to allow for the recognition of a claim based on breach of 
informational privacy, which is clearly an interest that is gaining in importance ± but 
has not yet been fully accepted ± in the modern world.77 
Niall Whitty78 has argued that the most obvious use of iniuria in the modern world is 
to provide a remedy for breach of personal privacy and he argues, surely rightly, that 
it would be far better to develop the law in this way than to require pursuers to 
attempt to squeeze breach of privacy into another action like defamation, breach of 
confidence or even breach of copyright79.  The danger, as always, is that policy 
considerations applicable to one action might be inappropriately applied to the other 
action.  What Whitty does not do, however, is to explain why it is better to use the 
traditional concept of injury rather than other, more contemporary, sources of privacy 
rights as the driver of this potential legal development.  Elspeth Reid is doubtful 
whether an expanded concept of iniuria would really serve this purpose and she is 
much more attracted to the idea of using the European Convention on Human Rights 
                                               
76 The true explanation for bereavement awards is that they serve the valuable policy purpose of ensuring that 
causing death is not cheaper to the wrongdoer than causing injury.  No other general principle can be extracted, 
it is submitted, from the existence of bereavement awards. 
77 No-one now believes the statement of Lord Hoffmann in R v Central Independent Television, plc [1994] 3 All 
ER 641, 652 that there is no question of balancing free speech with any other interest, because freedom of 
speech is µa trump card which always wins.¶ 
78 (n 10), 174 et seq. 
79 The use of copyright to protect privacy is evidenced in cases like Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 H&W 1 
(LC) and Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers [2007] 2 All ER 139. Ibbetson (CHAPTER ?) explores the 
artificiality involved when claims are construed as defamation when, in reality, they are no such thing. 
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to drive the development of the law of privacy.80  Her primary argument is that 
modern concerns, in particular informational privacy, can only be effectively 
protected if liability extends beyond intentional infringement.81  This may well be true, 
but given that the true basis of liability in Scotland is lack of legal justification for 
doing the intentional act, the criticism does not really explain why the actio iniuriarum 
should not be used in addition to, or as foundational of rights developed in light of, 
the ECHR.  The question in Von Hannover v Germany82 or even in Mosley v News 
Group Newspapers83 can as easily be structured as whether the newspapers had 
any legal justification for printing the stories about the celebrated personages in 
these cases.  The answer to such a question would invariably require an assessment 
of the value of the right to free speech and whether that is truly interfered with by 
prohibiting publication ± a similar analysis to that required under the European 
Convention.  So I am not convinced that we face a stark choice, between looking 
back to the actio iniuriarum or looking forward to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, for the appropriate way of protecting privacy: the focus of enquiry in 
both is the search for the legal justification for the publication. 
And there are other drivers to the development of the law of privacy, particularly the 
social need and growing desire to control an unruly press.84  There is, for example, 
much to be gained by expanding and adapting the µresponsible journalism¶ defence 
from the law of defamation85 as a useful way of balancing privacy and free speech.86  
                                               
80 n 12, [17.12]. 
81 Ibid, [17.13]. 
82 (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 
83 [2008] EMLR 20. 
84 The µphone-hacking¶ scandal that hit the UK press in the summer of 2011 reminded us that many journalistic 
practices, wide-spread and accepted, are anything but responsible. 
85 Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127; Bonnick v Morris [2003] 1 AC 300; Jameel v Wall Street 
Journal Europe (No. 3) [2007] 1 AC 359; Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 153 (CA) (argued 
before the Supreme Court on October 17, 2011). 
86 Admittedly, the European Court of Human Rights resisted importing one aspect of µresponsible journalism¶ 
(notification to the subject of an intention to publish material about them) into the article 8 right of privacy in 
Mosley v United Kingdom (2011) 161 NLJ 703. 
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The concept of publication in the public interest87 might also lend itself as a defence 
to an action based on an otherwise unjustifable infringement of personal privacy, by 
providing legal justification.  It is true that, in Scotland, that concept never caught  on 
as a defence in the law of defamation88 when truthful allegations were at issue,89 but 
the policy considerations are so different when dealing with privacy that I think that 
there is some attraction in developing a public interest defence.  In other words, 
existing notions of public interest, responsible journalism and a whole jurisprudence 
from the European Court are likely to act as drivers to the developing law of privacy, 
building upon the protection that iniuria DIIRUGVWRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VIHHOLQJV.  
 
Conclusion 
If the above analysis is correct, then the actio iniuriarum is certainly more than a 
romantic Romanism in Scots law, in that it serves to identify emotional hurt as a loss 
worthy, in some limited circumstances, of monetary redress by way of solatium.  
+RZHYHUWKHODZ¶VJHQHUDOUHVLVWHQFHWRUHJDUGLQJHPRWLRQDOKXUWDVDORVVLVVRXQG
and the identification of the circumstances in which that redress is justified is and 
should be driven by other forces than the ghosts of the past.  A combination of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and domestic developments in the control of 
unbridled journalism (which we are likely to see more of) may well be the way of the 
future.  Freedom from affront is no longer seen as a fundamental human interest.  
Privacy, on the other hand, is a fundamental human interest, like liberty, with which it 
has in common that it is an essential pre-condition for the development of our 
personality and talents: that is why we protect it.  How protection of privacy develops 
will depend upon the modern imperatives of our contemporary society and not upon 
the extent to which it can be accommodated in our old law. 
                                               
87 Which is the test in some jurisdictions: see for example Jonathan Burchell, µPersonality Rights in South 
Africa: Re-affirming Dignity¶, in Personality Rights in Scotland, (n 10), chap. 6. 
88 Bankton has not been followed when he said that truth is a defence to verbal injury (that is to say, not limited 
to defamation) µif it concerned the good of the commonwealth to have the crime known, and is not said with 
design of reproach, otherwise the general rule is veritas convitii non excusat a calumnia¶: 1, 10, 31 (citing 
Voet). 
89 Unlike in South Africa and elsewhere: see Descheemaeker (n 39). 
